Insurance Discrimination Against Battered Women: Proposed Legislative Protections by Morrison, Ellen J.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 72 | Issue 1 Article 11
Winter 1996
Insurance Discrimination Against Battered
Women: Proposed Legislative Protections
Ellen J. Morrison
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Insurance Law Commons, and the Law
and Gender Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Morrison, Ellen J. (1996) "Insurance Discrimination Against Battered Women: Proposed Legislative Protections," Indiana Law
Journal: Vol. 72 : Iss. 1 , Article 11.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol72/iss1/11
Insurance Discrimination Against
Battered Women: Proposed Legislative
Protections
ELLEN J. MORRISON*
INTRODUCTION
In the past thirty years, society has increasingly recognized the presence of
domestic violence in the United States, due largely to the efforts of victims'
advocates.' Although advocacy efforts have led to some legal reform,2 all too
often officers of the court and law refuse to enforce protective legislation due to
paternalistic notions of the sanctity of a man's home as his castle.3 The result is
that the offender fears no punishment, the abuse continues unchecked, and
domestic violence remains a private problem Each victim must bear alone her
own misfortune.'
Activists working with domestic violence victims instigated legislative reform
by emphasizing the twin objectives of educating the public about the breadth and
severity of domestic violence and by encouraging women to leave abusive
environments. As a result of these educational efforts, victims began to report
abuse incidents to law enforcement officers, allowing for both documentation of
the abuse and the procurement of restraining orders.' Furthermore, experts in the
medical community encouraged primary health care providers to document
* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1994,
DePauw University. Special thanks to those friends who offered comments on earlier drafts of
this Note. I would also like to thank my parents and grandparents for their support and
encouragement.
1. Edward S. Snyder, Remedies for Domestic Violence: A Continuing Challenge, 12 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRim. LAW. 335, 337-3 8 (1994).
2. For a complete bibliography of national domestic violence legislation in the United
States, see NATHAN A. ROSEN, BATTERED WIvES: A COMPREHENSIvE ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ARTICLES, BOOKS AND STATUTES IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 77-84
(1988).
3. Snyder, supra note 1, at 338; Susanne M. Browne, Note, Due Process and Equal
Protection Challenges to the Inadequate Response of the Police in Domestic Violence
Situations, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1295, 1298-99 (1995); see also Joan Zorza, Recognizing and
Protecting the Privacy and Confidentiality Needs ofBattered Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 273, 277-
80 (1995).
4. See, e.g., Bruno v. Codd, 393 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y. 1979).
5. This Note largely refers to victims of domestic violence as women. Department of
Justice statistics indicate that women are the overwhelming victims of abuse, although battering
does infrequently occur against men in relationships. BUREAu OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PuB. No. 149259, VIOLENCE BETWEEN INTIMATES (1994).
6. Snyder, supra note 1, at 344. But see Browne, supra note 3, at 1298-99 (noting the
failure of police departments and officers to make arrests in domestic violence situations).
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suspicious injuries in medical records for evidentiary purposes and also to
recognize, treat, and report suspected incidents of family violence.7
While the increased documentation of abuse-related injuries might have some
ameliorative effect on domestic violence, it has also resulted in a discrete and
extremely counterproductive form of discrimination. Some insurance companies
use the documented evidence of domestic violence as an underwriting criterion
upon which to deny an applicant insurance.8 Simply stated, some insurers use the
evidence of spousal abuse to discriminate against the victim by denying her
access to all forms of insurance.
This discriminatory insurance practice results in an irresolvable dilemma for
battered women. Victims realize that if they seek medical or police protection,
the resulting records will jeopardize their insurability. As a consequence, victims
may stop seeking help or reporting incidents of abuse in order to preserve
necessary insurance coverage.9 This insurance industry practice presents a
serious problem: it threatens the progress that has been made against domestic
violence in recent decades. Where the impetus has been toward heightened
awareness and reporting, this practice ultimately discourages reporting, medical
treatment, prosecution, and prevention.
This Note analyzes recently proposed legislation addressing the practice of
insurance discrimination against victims of domestic violence. Part I examines
the plight of battered women: the forces, both economic and otherwise, causing
individual women to stay with abusers and the tremendous social costs of
domestic violence. Part II defines the problem of insurance discrimination
against battered women, advancing arguments from opponents of the practice as
well as providing justifications given by insurance companies that condone it.
Part III analyzes recent federal and state legislative proposals that prohibit
insurance companies from underwriting on the basis of domestic violence.
Finally, Part IV condemns underwriting on the basis of domestic violence as
discriminatory and advocates regulation as an appropriate measure to prevent and
defray the social costs of domestic ,violence.
7. Ariella Hyman et al., Laws Mandating Reporting of Domestic Violence: Do They
Promote Patient Well-Being?, 273 JAMA 1781, 1781-82 (1995); Antonia C. Novello et al.,
A Medical Response to Domestic Violence, 267 JAMA 3132 (1992).
8. Women's Law Project & Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Insurance
Discrimination Against Victims of Domestic Violence (Sept. 1995) [hereinafter Insurance
Discrimination] (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Women's Law Project and the
Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence); see also, Anne Stein, Will Health Care
Reform Protect Victims ofAbuse?: Treating Domestic Violence As a Public Health Issue,
HuM. RTs., Fall 1994, at 16, 16-17 (1994); Insurance Benefits Denied to Battered Women,
NCADV VoicE, Winter 1994, at 19.
9. Monica C. Fountain, Insurance Companies Hit Battered Women Too, CHI. TRIB., June
4, 1995, § 6, at 1; Katharine Q. Seelye, Insurabilityfor Battered Women, N.Y. TIMES, May 12,
1994, at A9; Insurance Discrimination, supra note 8.
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I. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Domestic violence is an all too common phenomenon in the United States.
Estimates show that approximately four million women are beaten annually by
their partners."0 Moreover, experts in the domestic violence field all agree that
the statistics of actually identified incidents vastly underestimate the frequency
of domestic violence, due to the large incidence of underreporting associated
with this particular crime."
The United States Supreme Court acknowledged the danger and prevalence of
domestic violence in Planned Parenthood v. Casey:2
[O]n an average day in the United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely
assaulted by their male partners. Many of these incidents involve sexual
assault. . . . Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse.
Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of
women, is also common. Many victims of domestic violence remain with
their abusers, perhaps because they perceive no superior alternative. Many
abused women who find temporary refuge in shelters return to their husbands,
in large part because they have no other source of income. Returning to one's
abuser can be dangerous.... Thirty percent of female homicide victims are
killed by their male partners. 3
A. Why Battered Women Stay
One major misconception often mentioned in public debate is that battered
women have the freedom to leave their abusers, yet choose to stay. In reality,
there are often insurmountable barriers which prevent abuse victims from
escaping their violent surroundings. Battered women are frequently stuck in their
abusive relationships because they have no money, no source of income, no
affordable housing, and because they justifiably fear retaliation from their
partners if they do leave.'4 Despite these obstacles, most battered women attempt
10. OLA W. BARNETT & ALYCE D. LAVIOLETTE: IT COULD HAPPEN TO ANYONE, WHY
BATTERED WOMEN STAY at xviii (1993); Martha F. Davis & Susan J. Kraham, Protecting
Women's Welfare in the Face of Violence, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1141, 1144 (1995); Stein,
supra note 8, at 17; W. H. Hallock, Note, The Violence Against Women Act: Civil Rights for
SexualAssault Victims, 68 IND. L.J. 577, 585 (1993).
11. BARNETE & LAVIOLETrE, supra note 10, at xviii; Browne, supra note 3, at 1298; see
also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887-97 (1992). In Casey, the Court recounted
the American Medical Association's view that most studies of domestic violence generate
figures which are "'marked underestimates,' because the nature of these incidents discourages
women from reporting them, and because surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who
do not speak English well, and women who are homeless or in institutions or hospitals when
the survey is conducted." Id. at 891.
12. Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
13. Id. at 891 (citations omitted).
14. Id.; Joan Zorza, Women Battering: High Costs and the State of the Law, 28
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 383, 386 (1994).
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to escape the abuse: in one survey, fifty to ninety percent of the respondents
reported that they had attempted to leave. 5
1. Financial Strain
Many victims lack the requisite economic resources to flee an abusive mate.
Most battered women are economically dependent on their abuser and, frequently
as a result of the abusive relationship, have no funds of their own.' 6 Economic
deprivation typically accompanies domestic violence and represents another form
of control abusers exert over their partners.17
In addition, escaping an abusive partner often requires flight, which may also
involve leaving an established lifestyle including a job and a regular paycheck.
Unfortunately, even if a woman does escape the immediately abusive situation
and simultaneously maintains her job, it is not uncommon for the abuser to
sabotage the victim's employment with his disruptive behavior." This workplace
harassment usually reflects the abuser's efforts to return the victim to the abusive
environment.
2. Shelter Shortages
Battered women always face another major obstacle-locating adequate
affordable housing. Permanent housing is difficult to locate and prohibitively
expensive. 9 Of those women and children living on the street, homeless, fully
fifty percent claim to be in flight from abusive partners.2" In a recent survey of
abuse victims staying in a battered women's shelter, forty-one percent specified
adequate housing as a much needed resource.2'
Temporary shelters offer another form of refuge for victims in flight from
domestic abuse. However, abuse victims are lucky if they can find a vacancy in
battered women's shelters, as shelters routinely turn women and children away
15. Davis & Kraham, supra note 10, at 1146; Zorza, supra note 3, at 280 (citing a study
finding that domestic violence victims went to enormous lengths to leave abusers and to protect
themselves, but that their efforts were often unsuccessful).
16. Casey, 505 U.S. at 891-92; Davis & Kraham, supra note 10, at 1153.
17. Browne, supra note 3, at 1296; LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
28 (1984).
18. Davis & Kraham, supra note 10, at 1152; see also Zorza, supra note 3, at 277 (stating
that 74% of battered women who work experience on-the-job harassment by their abusers and
that 20% of all employed battered women lose their jobs due to workplace harassment,
occurring over the telephone and in person, by their abusers).
19. Zorza, supra note 3, at 275.
20. Id (citing The Violence Against Women Act of 1990: Hearings on S. 2754 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d. Sess. 37 (1990)); see also Davis & Kraham,
supra note 10, at 1154 (stating that battered women, with or without children, comprise a
significant portion of the homeless population).
21. Davis & Kraham, supra note 10, at 1154 (citing Cris M. Sullivan et al., After the Crisis:
A Needs Assessment of Women Leaving a Domestic Violence Shelter, 7 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS
267, 272 (1992).
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due to limited capacity.22 Furthermore, shelters usually only allow domestic
violence victims to stay for a limited period of time, four to eight weeks
maximum.23 When victims have exhausted their time at a shelter they, and
frequently their children, are literally out on the street. The remaining choices
available to most victims are tragic: return to their abusive surroundings, locate
another temporary shelter, or live poverty-stricken on the street.
3. Retaliatory Threats
Despite these economic hurdles, the majority of battered women who come
forward and report the abuse do try to protect themselves and their children from
violence by leaving.24 Leaving an abusive mate, however, is no guarantee of
safety. On the contrary, the violence frequently escalates after the woman flees
her abusive surroundings.25 Of the reported incidents, battered women who
separate or divorce their partners are more frequently and more severely beaten
than those who stay.26 Estranged men, as opposed to those living with their
mates, commit seventy-nine percent of all reported spousal violence.27
Additionally, women who leave are fourteen times more likely to be severely
beaten by their enraged abusers than those women who stay, "as batterers
escalate their violence and harassment in an attempt to coerce the battered
woman into reconciliation or to retaliate for her departure. 28 Women who leave
their batterers face an elevated risk of assault which sometimes ends in death.29
Both the justifiable fear for one's own safety, and risks associated with raising
the level of conflict by flight, may explain why battered women stay.
Dismal choices entrap the abuse victim in a lose-lose situation: "[w]ithout
access to the support necessary to survive at a minimal level, a victim of
domestic violence and her children may be forced to choose between a life of
abuse and a life of poverty."3 All of the above factors-scarce economic
resources, inability to secure affordable housing, shortages of temporary shelter
space, and fear of retaliatory attacks by estranged partners-furnish a glimpse
into the predicament of a battered woman and help explain the oppressive
conditions a woman faces if she leaves. A denial of insurance coverage, solely
because a woman is a victim of battering, only serves to exacerbate her economic
and social difficulties.
22. Zorza, supra note 3, at 276; Browne, supra note 3, at 1296.
23. Zorza, supra note 3, at 276.
24. See sources cited supra note 15.
25. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 892 (1992).
26. Zorza, supra note 14, at 386.
27. Zorza, supra note 3, at 274.
28. Davis & Kraham, supra note 10, at 1146-47.
29. Zorza, supra note 14, at 387 (stating that three of four women killed in the United
States are murdered by their current or former partners, usually when the women attempt to
leave or have already left).
30. Davis & Kraham, supra note 10, at 1154.
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B. The Social Costs of Battering
The societal cost of domestic violence is staggering. The expenses generated
by battering remain uncalculated,3 primarily due to a lack of complete data
which stems from the reluctance of the victims and the legal, medical, and law
enforcement systems to intervene in the domestic domain.32 As a result, society
as a whole shoulders the enormous costs that flow from the "private problem"
between the abused and the abuser.33
1. Calculated Costs
Based on reported incidents, some of the costs related to domestic violence are
quantifiable and the numbers are astounding. Domestic violence costs an
estimated $6.5 billion annually in the United States.34 It is estimated that abuse-
related medical treatment costs the nation approximately $31 billion annually, or
approximately $124 per year for every person living in the nation?5 A study
sponsored by the Pennsylvania Blue Shield Institute found that the health care
costs associated with domestic violence totaled $326.6 million in Pennsylvania
between 1990 and 1991.36 In addition, the United States Surgeon General has
reported that more women are injured each year by battering than all other causes
combined.37
Law enforcement efforts also have a price. In 1989, New York City spent
approximately $41 million in police, court, and incarceration costs resulting from
domestic violence arrests.38 The average cost for each domestic violence-related
arrest totaled $3241.2 9 Domestic violence represents the largest category of
emergency calls to police each year.40
Battering also imposes a direct cost in the employment setting. Businesses
suffer losses from employee absenteeism and reduced worker productivity due
to the impact of domestic violence on the workplace.4' The estimated value
31. Zorza, supra note 14, at 383.
32. See generally Snyder, supra note I.
33. Zorza, supra note 14, at 385.
34. Id. at 383.
35. Additionally, 20% to 35% of women seeking medical care in emergency rooms are
there due to domestic violence. Id.
36. R. Robert Tyson & Robert E. McAfee, Family Violence and the Insurance Industry:
Education, Nut Discrimination, 274 JAMA 1428 (1995).
37. Hallock, supra note 10, at 586 (citing S. REP. No. 197, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 36 n.10
(1991)).
38. This figure does not include the cost of defense attorneys for the indigent. Zorza, supra
note 14, at 385; see also Roberta Cooper Ramo, ABA President-Elect Announces Domestic
Violence Initiative, 29 FAM. L.Q., Summer 1995, at ix.
39. Zorza, supra note 14, at 385.
40. RicHARD J. GELLES & CLAIRE PEDRICK CORNELL, IN'HMATE VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES 131
(1990).
41. Ramo, supra note 38, at ix.
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employers lose as a result of battering amounts to $13 billion annually.42
Furthermore, the victim suffers both a direct loss of earnings and an impaired
earning capacity, and may well lose her job if domestic violence actually occurs
in the workplace.
In addition, society bears the cost of maintaining domestic violence and other
temporary shelters for abused women. In New York City alone, these costs total
approximately $30 to $40 million annually, which is probably a conservative
estimate.4 3 Government coffers also fund foster care programs for the children
of battered mothers. The City of New York reportedly spends $71.5 million
annually on foster care benefits," and forty percent of the children receiving
these benefits would not require foster care were their mothers not the victims
of abuse.4" It is difficult to imagine how much money the nation as a whole
spends for this type of foster care.
2. Uncalculated Costs
A number of identifiable expenditures are missing from the cost tabulation of
domestic violence. First, many battered women's injuries, which can be traced
to abuse, are never connected to their true cause and thus remain unmeasured.46
Second, each unreported incident of domestic violence includes some or all of
the identified costs listed in the preceding Part, but are not tallied. Third, the
price of remedial services such as counseling, which help women and children
who are either emotionally traumatized by the abuse or physically injured,
remains uncalculated.47 The psychological wounds caused by domestic violence
are frequently more severe than the physical injuries48 and usually last longer.
Finally, women who are battered during pregnancy often produce children with
birth defects: domestic violence has been identified as the "leading cause of birth
defects, more than all other medical causes combined., ' The cost borne by
society of raising children with birth defects caused by physical abuse has not
been measured. Yet these injured children are perhaps the most tragic victims of
domestic violence.
In summary, no one knows precisely how' much domestic violence costs the
nation each year. However, it is undisputed that the hidden, and not so hidden,
costs of domestic violence fall upon all elements of society and particularly upon
the state and federal governments. Recent developments in the insurance industry
42. This figure includes the loss of productivity due to harassment, employee absenteeism
and tardiness, leaving work early, and use of company time to call doctors, counselors, lawyers,
shelters, family, and friends because the victims cannot do so at home. Zorza, supra note 14,
at 385.
43. Id. at 384.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 383; Hyman, supra note 7, at 1781.
47. Zorza, supra note 14, at 383.
48. Id. at 383-84.
49. Eli H. Newberger, Abuse of Pregnant Women and Adverse Birth Outcome: Current
Knowledge and Implications for Practice, 267 JAMA 2370 (1992).
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have further shifted these costs onto society. When Pennsylvania's insurance
companies documented the expenses generated by battering, the costs were so
staggering that the companies began to reject applications of abuse victims as
bad insurance risks." Soon other insurers followed suit in denying battered
women access to insurance coverage. 1 Currently, several major insurers identify
a history of domestic violence as an underwriting criteria and, ultimately, as a
basis for denying insurance to battered women. The denial of insurance is yet
another barrier that prevents battered women from improving their situations,
another hurdle that thwarts the eradication of domestic violence.
II. INSURANCE DISCRIMINATION
Many well-known insurers regularly refuse battered women insurance. The
American Council of Life Insurance and the Health Insurance Association of
America defend the practice, while the Prudential Insurance Company, First
Colony Life Insurance, Nationwide, and State Farm Mutual Insurance Company
are just a few examples of insurance companies that have adopted underwriting
procedures which discriminate against victims of domestic violence. 2 In the past
year, those insurers that routinely refuse to insure women who have suffered
injury at the hands of an abuser have received sharp criticism. While
approximately half of the nation's largest insurance companies have admitted to
utilizing domestic violence as an underwriting criterion, exactly how often
insurers deny applications from or coverage to battered women is unknown.
Advocates for domestic violence victims have proposed both state and federal
legislation which would prohibit this type of discrimination against battered
women. Insurers have opposed this legislation, claiming that it would impair the
free market and abridge the insurers' right to contract on the basis of risk. 3 In
addition, these insurers defend their underwriting practices on the grounds of
fairness to consumers and necessity in providing affordable, yet profitable,
products. 4
A. Frequency of Discrimination
The discovery of the insurance company practices of denying access or
restricting coverage to battered women has been recent. In 1994, the United
States House Judiciary Committee conducted an informal survey of sixteen of the
nation's largest insurers representing about fifty percent of the insurance
50. See, e.g., Insurance Discrimination, supra note 8.
51. See supra text accompanying note 8.
52. Deborah L. Shelton, Adding Insult to Injury: Families Hurt by Domestic Violence Take
a Second Hit When Insurers Deny Them Coverage. The Practice Is a Blow to the AMA's
Campaign Against Family Violence, AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 4, 1995, at 11, 12; Fern Shen, For
the Battered Spouse, Insurers' Bias Worsens Pain, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1995, at Al;
Insurance Discrimination, supra note 8.
53. See infra part II.D.
54. See infra part II.D.2.
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market." Eight of the sixteen insurance companies admitted to using domestic
violence as a factor when making decisions about issuing insurance policies and
setting premiums.56 Since the survey, at least two of the insurers say that they
have changed their policies and no longer discriminate against abuse victims. 7
A variety of factors make it difficult to estimate how widespread this insurance
practice is or how many women have been denied coverage because of their
abused status. First and foremost, domestic violence remains a hidden problem,
which goes largely unreported because victims are often reluctant to come
forward due to economic concerns or fear of retaliation by the abuser. 8 Second,
insurers are not obligated to file with state insurance departments the criteria they
utilize in making coverage decisions or otherwise disclose their underwriting
standards. This results in an unregulated use of.underwriting criteria." Finally,
insurance companies are not required to disclose reasons for rejecting
applicants.60 All of these factors contribute to uncertainty in determining the
exact number of incidences of insurance discrimination against domestic
violence victims. Nevertheless, since it is known that in 1994 approximately fifty
percent of the largest insurers in the United States admitted to using domestic
violence as an underwriting criterion, it is reasonable to assume that other
smaller insurers apply similar standards for rejecting battered women's
applications for insurance coverage.
B. Denial of Insurance
Many insurance companies 6' have responded to the emerging expense
assessments of domestic violence by denying victims access to all types of
insurance-medical, life, disability, property, and casualty.62 Insurers acquire this
information from abuse victims by requiring applicants to sign a release
permitting the insurer to obtain medical records, which often reveal the damaging
information regarding prior abuse.63 Because health care providers have become
more effective in recognizing and documenting evidence of domestic violence,
the insurer likely has a reliable source of information in medical records.64
55. New Law to Make Insurance Companies Cover Abused Women (National Public Radio
broadcast, Mar. 8, 1995) [hereinafter NPR Broadcast]; see also Insurance Discrimination,
supra note 8.
56. Insurance Discrimination, supra note 8.
57. Both State Farm and Nationwide claim to have abandoned discriminatory insurance
practices against abuse victims. Shen, supra note 52; NPR Broadcast, supra note 55.
58. Zorza, supra note 3, at 274-75.
59. Donald W. Light, The Practice and Ethics of Risk-Rated Health Insurance, 267 JAMA
2503, 2504 (1992); see also Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too Important to Be
Left to the Actuaries, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 349, 420 (1986).
60. Insurance Discrimination, supra note 8.
61. For information regarding insurance companies which have discriminated against
battered women in the past, see supra text accompanying note 52.
62. See sources cited supra note 8.
63. Insurance Discrimination, supra note 8.
64. See generally sources cited supra note 7 (discussing the medical profession's efforts
to increasingly recognize, document, and treat cases of domestic abuse).
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Additionally, insurance companies share confidential information concerning
client risk factors through subscriber databases such as Equifax6" and the
Medical Information 3ureau, an industry-funded organization that shares
computerized information about applicants with some 600 insurance
companies." Finally, insurance companies can gain access to an individual's
history of abuse by examining court documents and credit reports that often
contain information regarding court-ordered protection orders.67
This discrimination against battered women constitutes one more obstruction
preventing victims from leaving abusive situations." Insurance discrimination
may endanger abuse victims by reducing their access to important insurance
benefits which are critical in financing medical care or maintaining the family in
the case of death or disability. 9 Moreover, once victims realize that they may
lose insurance benefits by seeking help from medical workers and the legal
system, they may stop reporting violent episodes70 and may not disclose the true
cause of their injuries.7" Eventually, doctors and health care workers may even
stop documenting abuse injuries in order to protect victims' insurance coverage72
and to assure their own payment. All of these consequences undermine the legal
system's goal of prosecuting the abuser by reducing the reporting and
documentation of abuse. As a result, many battered women are faced with two
oppressive options-staying with the abuser or struggling in poverty.
C. Principles of Insurance Law
Insurance companies utilize certain procedures when determining to insure, or
not to insure, anapplicant. Domestic violence is one basis upon which some
insurers reject individuals seeking coverage. On one hand, advocates who oppose
this practice suggest that government regulation of the insurance industry is
necessary to prohibit discrimination against battered women. However, insurance
companies that rely on a history of domestic violence as an underwriting criterion
oppose state regulation and defend their practice of discriminating against
domestic violence victims.
65. Gina Kolata, When Patients' Records Are Commodities for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
1995, at Al; Insurance Discrimination, supra note 8.
66. Benjamin Schatz, The AIDS Insurance Crisis: Underwriting or Overreaching?, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1782, 1801 (1987); Shen, supra note 52; see also Light, supra note 59, at 2505
("Those excluded or denied cannot easily run to another insurer, because insurance companies
share 'confidential' information through a common data bank.").
67. Insurance Discrimination, supra note 8.
68. See supra part I.
69. Insurance Discrimination, supra note 8.
70. "If [the abuse victim] is honest because she wants [the battering] documented for a
protective order, she won't be covered. If she lies so she will be covered, it won't be
documented." Stein, supra note 8, at 17 (first alteration added) (quoting Nancy Durborow of
the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence).
71. Insurance Discrimination, supra note 8; see also Fountain, supra note 9; Seelye, supra
note 9.
72. Insurance Discrimination, supra note 8.
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1. The Underwriting Process
Insurance companies that operate in a private system of insurance develop
methods which assess each applicant's risk of loss," a and consequently the
insurer's risk of paying a claim. In the underwriting process, insurers decide
whom they will insure and on what terms they will insure them. 4 thereby
deciding which individuals receive insurance coverage. 5 Companies usually rely
upon statistical analysis of risk in making underwriting decisions.76 The insurers'
alleged rationale for using a statistical system of risk rating involves fairness and
efficiency." In theory, risk rating is fair because an insured who participates in
high-risk activities is likely to incur higher bills and accordingly is charged a
higher price for coverage. 8 Insurers further claim that this underwriting model
offers an incentive for efficient behavior because higher rates deter individuals
from engaging in high-risk behavior!9 For example, lower premiums for non-
smokers encourage smokers to kick their high-risk habit.80
The insurance industry has vast discretion in making underwriting decisions
and zealously guards that power.8' The actual underwriting criteria used by
companies are rarely, if ever, reviewed by insurance regulators.82 This lack of
oversight provides the less scrupulous insurer the opportunity to engage in
discriminatory underwriting."3
A closer look at the actual practice reveals that underwriting decisions are
rarely made using a statistically sound mathematical methodology,84 and are often
made with little regard to social impact.85 For example, insurers do not, in a
scientific and consistent fashion, consider all known risk factors when making
underwriting decisions. First, some insurers admit that they make choices among
numerous existing risk factors-electing not to use some of them-and that the
73. Schatz, supra note 66, at 1803.
74. See generally ROBERTE. KEETON& ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 2.1(b) at 35-36
(1988); Nicholas A. Papa, Comment, Testing the Health Insurance Industry's Response to the
AIDS Epidemic, 18 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 687, 691 (1992).
75. Schatz, supra note 66, at 1803 (arguing that underwriting decisions are socially-charged
and of the public interest because they determine which individuals receive quality health care).
76. Mark Scherzer, Private Insurance, in AIDS LAW TODAY: ANEW GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC
404, 409 (Scott Burris et al. eds., 1993).
77.1d. at 410.
78. But see Light, supra note 59 (arguing that risk rating is, in reality, a morally unfair
system because it deliberately capitalizes on social inequality and disadvantage by depriving
those with the greatest need for medical care of access to medical attention).
79. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 71-74 (1986).
80. See id.; see also Papa, supra note 74, at 691-92.
81. Robert Lowe, Genetic Testing and Insurance: Apocalypse Now?, 40 DRAKE L. REV.
507, 523-24 (1991); Wortham, supra note 59, at 354.
82. Light, supra note 59, at 2504; Wortham, supra note 59, at 371-73.
83. Wortham, supra note 59, at 354-55.
84. See id. at 376.
85. See Schatz, supra note 66, at 1803.
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criteria used are not always based upon risk. 6 Second, insurers opt not to use
some risk factors to promote economic efficiency: for some risk factors, the
expenses associated with identifying and segregating the information necessary
to use them as underwriting criteria surpass what the company must pay out in
claims.87 Third, insurers choose not to utilize other risk factors because of their
potentially negative impact on marketing.88 Fourth, studies demonstrate that
different insurance companies vary considerably in how much weight they
attribute to identical conditions, leading to inaccuracies and wide variations in
risk rating. 9 Finally, some companies often rely on assumptions and stereotypes,
rather than exclusively considering scientific, statistical analysis, when
determining risk.9"
This examination of the actual underwriting process reveals that it is neither
a neutral process nor a statistically sound method. As a result, regulation which
prohibits discrimination based on domestic violence would not dismantle the
insurance industry or destroy the flawed methodology of the underwriting
process.9
2. Industry Regulation
Regulations already force the insurance industry to consider or ignore certain
criteria in the underwriting process that may be contrary to a purely statistical
risk analysis. This government regulation of the insurance industry is considered
desirable due to the pervasiveness of insurance in American society.92
The federal government has had the authority to regulate the insurance industry
since 1944, but it has been reluctant to exercise that power.93 However, certain
types of insurance discrimination are prohibited by federal law because they are
86. Insurance Discrimination, supra note 8; see also Light, supra note 59, at 2505;
Wortham, supra note 59, at 375-76.
87. Insurance Discrimination, supra note 8.
88. See Light, supra note 59, at 2505 (stating that marketing departments of insurance
companies adjust actuarial figures in order to maximize market share and profits); Wortham,
supra note 59, at 375 (citing evidence of insurers' admissions that one motivating factor for
using sex as a classifier in life insurance policies was the perception of a growing female
market).
89. Light, supra note 59, at 2505.
90. Schatz, supra note 66, at 1787-88; Scherzer, supra note 76, at 417 (noting that
insurance companies relied on social stereotypes, entirely at odds with a scientific assessment
of risk, by using employment in stereotypically gay professions as an indicator of single male
applicants' risk of contracting the AIDS virus); see also Insurance Discrimination, supra note
8.
91. Wortham, supra note 59, at 377.
92. Scherzer, supra note 76, at 412-13; Wortham, supra note 59, at 350-51.
93. Wortham, supra note 59, at 415, 386 n.206 (explaining the United States Supreme
Court's holding in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944),
subjecting the insurance industry to federal antitrust laws, and the subsequent passage of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982), which exempted the business of
insurance from federal regulation if these regulations conflicted with state laws regulating
insurance).
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socially unacceptable.94 Federal law currently forbids insurance companies from
discriminating in underwriting on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin in employer-sponsored insurance plans, but not in private
insurance decisions.9 5 Other federal civil rights statutes support a ban on racial
classifications in private insurance decisions.96 However, insurers remain free to
underwrite on the basis of gender in private lines of insurance, 97 making
insurance discrimination against battered women permissible.
States engage in extensive regulation of the industry and restrict insurers from
using certain classifications in underwriting.98 State law restricts companies from
underwriting on the basis of race, age, ethnic origin, residence, sex, and some
physical disabilities.99 However, most state laws do not enjoin insurers from
using domestic violence as an underwriting criterion. Therefore, enacting a
regulation to prohibit this practice would be an appropriate measure.'
Insurance companies are private businesses dealing in a commodity needed by
most Americans, yet the private goal of maximizing profit is often in conflict
with the important public value of ensuring broad insurance coverage.' "Within
this [private insurance] system, the desire of the insurance industry to guarantee
its fiscal solvency must be balanced against society's need to maintain its moral
solvency. Insurance companies' unjustified fears about the former should not
lead us to sacrifice the latter."'"2 Regulation of the insurance industry to prohibit
discrimination against abuse victims is a necessary step toward accomplishing
the dual public mission of extinguishing domestic violence and ensuring the
availability of insurance. 3
D. Justifications for Discrimination
Insurance companies defend their decision to use domestic violence as an
underwriting criterion on several grounds. These insurers contend that domestic
violence victims choose to stay with their abusers and are more likely to
accumulate abuse-related claims in the future, making them high-risk applicants
who are normally denied coverage.0 4 Some insurers even go so far as to argue
that insuring abuse victims creates an incentive for batterers to kill in an effort
to collect on life insurance policies. Finally, some insurance companies claim
94. Schatz, supra note 66, at 1791-92 (arguing that socially-charged underwriting
classifications are not necessarily moral solely because they are statistically based); Shen, supra
note 52.
95. Wortham, supra note 59, at 364-65.
96. Id. at 362-63.
97. Id. at 363.
98. Wortham, supra note 59, at 364-69; Scherzer, supra note 76, at 412-15; Insurance
Discrimination, supra note 8.
99. Insurance Discrimination, supra note 8.
100. Id.
101. Scherzer, supra note 76, at 412.
102. Schatz, supra note 66, at 1805.
103. Wortham, supra note 59, at 415; see also Insurance Discrimination, supra note 8.
104. See discussion infra part II.D.2.
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that a history of domestic violence is a preexisting condition and, as a result,
injuries stemming from that condition are uninsurable.
1. "Choosing" to Stay
Some insurers maintain that insurance discrimination against abuse victims is
appropriate because battered women "choose" to stay in abusive environments.
Some industry spokespersons maintain that insurance companies should have the
discretion to deny insurance or reduce coverage to any person with a dangerous
or risky lifestyle." 5 Thus, a common argument insurers use to support
discrimination is that battered women choose to lead a risky lifestyle. One
company spokesperson summarized the view that insurers cannot be responsible
for a woman's unwise choices: "[A battered woman] has a choice to move on
someplace else. We're a business, not a social welfare organization." 06
Insurers have also justified their position by comparing coverage of domestic
violence victims to insuring skydivers, race car drivers, and professional
boxers.' O7 Domestic violence is a crime, however, rather than a voluntary lifestyle
or career choice.'0 8 It seems easy to distinguish between the two groups-victims
on one hand and skydivers, race car drivers, and boxers on the other-in several
ways. Abused women are victims of criminal activity;0 9 skydivers, race car
drivers, and boxers are not. Skydivers, race car drivers, and boxers choose their
vocations, but abused women neither enjoy violence nor do they choose to be
battered."0 Finally, skydivers, race car drivers, and boxers can easily quit their
activity to avoid the risk, while formidable obstacles involving economics and
safety deter battered women from leaving their abusers."'
Advocates, lawmakers, and insurance regulators condemn insurance
discrimination as revictimizing the battered woman-a classic case of penalizing
the crime victim." 2 They argue that domestic violence is an important social and
public health issue, thereby elevating its importance beyond a mere criterion for
denying insurance."' There are social implications for refusing to insure battered
women-discouraging victims from reporting crimes, seeking help, and leaving
batterers-each of which should override the profit motive."' Denying insurance
to abuse victims creates yet another obstacle hindering women from leaving
abusive relationships. Finally, critics of this practice claim that insurance
105. Fountain, supra note 9.
106. Shen, supra note 52 (quoting David McMahon, Vice President of First Colony Life
Insurance Co.).
107. Id. (statement of John D. Harker, director of the life insurance service center at
Nationwide) ("'What we're looking for are situations where people basically have risks higher
than the general population,' ... [such as] 'professional boxers ... race car drivers or... [a
daredevil like] Evil Knievel."') (first omission and alteration added).
108. Insurance Discrimination, supra note 8.
109. Stein, supra note 8, at 16-17.
110. Zorza, supra note 3, at 274.
111. See supra part I.A.
112. See generally Fountain, supra note 9.
113. Id.
114. See generally Shen, supra note 52.
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discrimination creates a disincentive to securing police protection and even
medical treatment, as battered women attempt to avoid documentation of their
abuse." 5
2. Categorizing Victims as "High-Risk"
Insurance companies also defend the use of domestic violence as an
underwriting criterion on grounds of economic impact. Industry spokespersons
insist that factoring a history of domestic violence into the underwriting decision
is necessary to avoid insuring high-risk applicants who would ultimately force
companies to raise insurance rates for all customers, including those who do not
incur similar expenses." 6 One company spokesperson went so far as to claim that
insurers could face bankruptcy if they fail to take into account risks such as
battering, breast cancer, or skydiving." 7
The insurers' fears of insolvency are refuted by simple reference to those
insurance companies which do not currently use domestic violence as an
underwriting criterion,"' such as Aetna and Blue Cross/Blue Shield."' These
companies are still profitable and able to offer consumers affordable products
without discriminating against abuse victims. Even companies that attempt to
screen domestic violence victims from their risk pool inevitably cover abuse
victims when the abuse remains unidentified, as is often the case. 2 ° Furthermore,
insurance companies unwittingly insure battered women through group insurance
plans, even when they deny abuse victims insurance when issuing individual
policies. 2 ' In contrast to individual underwriting techniques, insurers
underwriting for group insurance plans consider only the relevant characteristics
of the group as a whole, not the individual characteristics of each group
member." In group insurance plans, insurers rarely expend resources to evaluate
the risk of each individual worker-including those with a history of domestic
violence-because insurers assume that within such a group only a few
individuals will have conditions so severe as to render them a substandard or
noninsurable risk.1
23
Furthermore, insurance companies have yet to produce any statistical evidence
that women with a history of domestic violence exposure are at a greater risk of
115. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
116. Shen, supra note 52; see also Papa, supra note 74, at 691-92 (relating the insurance
industry's belief that for a company to remain fiscally solvent, it must be able to either exclude
or charge higher premiums for high-risk applicants).
117. Shen, supra note 52 (citing statement of David McMahon, Vice President of First
Colony Life Insurance Co.).
118. For an explanation of underwriting techniques, see generally Karen A. Clifford &
Russel P. luculano, AIDS and Insurance: The Rationale for AIDS-Related Testing, 100 HARv.
L. REv. 1806 (1987); Wortham, supra note 59; Papa, supra note 74, at 691-92.
119. Judi Hasson, Firms That Don't Insure Battered Women Examined, USA TODAY, June
2, 1994, at 6A.
120. See id.
121. See Shen, supra note 52.
122. Clifford & Iuculano, supra note 118, at 1809.
123. Id.
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incurring future medical expenses than non-victims .124 After reversing its
company policy of discriminating against battered women, major insurer State
Farm Life admitted that it had no statistical basis for refusing to underwrite
abuse victims. 25 The company justified the previous underwriting practice,
despite lacking statistical evidence, as "just sort of a logical conclusion."'126
3. Deterring Abusers from Murder
Some insurers offer an additional rationale for refusing to extend coverage to
battered women. Insurance companies claim that denying coverage to domestic
violence victims protects them from the risk of being murdered by their abusers.
Similarly, avoiding this risk insulates insurers from potential lawsuits.'27 These
insurers state that if the batterer is the beneficiary of the life insurance policy,
extending coverage provides a financial incentive for the abuser to kill the
abused woman to receive the proceeds from the policy.'28
Insurers have not provided evidence that insuring battered women fosters
domestic violence or that denying coverage deters domestic violence.'29 Many
experts believe that abusers batter their victims for reasons of control and
domination, rather than to capitalize on insurance policies. 13 Others relate that
the likelihood of this scenario playing out in real life is remote, and that the
argument rests on faulty reasoning because there is no factual evidence to
support it.13 ' Finally, insurers are protected from lawsuits: policy provisions
usually prevent beneficiaries from recovering when the policyholder's death or
injury is the result of intentional misconduct, and state law typically prohibits an
abuser from receiving benefits from the policy of an injured or murdered
victim.
32
124. Shen, supra note 52 ("[Insurance companies] 'have not come forward with any bona
fide evidence that the victims of abuse are at a greater risk' [than any other group] ...
(quoting Deborah Senn, Washington State Insurance Commissioner).
125. Fountain, supra note 9; Leslie Scism, State Farm Eases Policy on Victims of Family
Violence, WALL ST. J., June 1, 1994, at A8.
126. Fountain, supra note 9 (quoting K.C. Eynatten, a State Farm spokesperson).
127. Shen, supra note 52.
128. Seelye, supra note 9.
129. Insurance Discrimination, supra note 8.
130. "'[Blattering is not something people do for money'.... 'The immediate cause of
battering may be that she burned the toast, and the general issue is dominance. But it doesn't
happen because the batterer went and checked the insurance policy."' Shen, supra note 52
(quoting Susan Kraham, staff lawyer with the Legal Defense and Education Fund of the
National Organization for Women).
131. "'This is the kind of logic that leads to this pernicious practice [of insurance
discrimination against domestic violence victims]'.... 'Blame the victim, and then come up
with a flimsy excuse why victims of crime shouldn't be able to get life and health insurance."'
Fountain, supra note 9 (quoting Josh Isay, spokesman for U.S. Representative Charles
Schumer).
132. Insurance Discrimination, supra note 8.
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4. Classifying Abuse as a Preexisting Condition
Some insurance companies refuse to cover claims resulting from domestic
violence on the theory that the injuries are a result of a preexisting condition.'33
Claims which stem from a preexisting condition are those resulting from an
injury or sickness sustained by the insured prior to the effective date of the
policy's coverage. 3 4 A preexisting condition limitation excludes or limits the
benefits the insurer must pay for claims that arise from the preexisting
condition."' The practice of classifying domestic violence-related injuries as
"preexisting conditions" is patently unfair: insurers penalize battered women for
having been crime victims in the past by refusing to cover future injuries that
may result from domestic violence because they stem from a "previously existing
condition."'36 Denying insurance to abuse victims today holds the victims
responsible for any past or future criminal activity of the abuser.'37 "'The whole
preexisting conditions [argument] is tremendously unfair'..... 'If you have a
violent neighbor (who batters you), it's not a preexisting condition, but if it's by
your husband it is; that's unfair."".3
Insurers' arguments that a history of domestic violence is a preexisting
condition justifying denial of coverage appear unsupported by legal precedent. 3 9
Insureds can rely on long-standing legal precedent regarding conditions like
tuberculosis, in which courts found mere infection, which was not causing illness
or certain to cause future illness, to be an insufficient basis for a preexisting
condition. 4 This logic is applicable to enjoining the use of domestic violence as
a preexisting condition: a woman's history of battering does not indicate that she
is more likely to be battered in the future. One lawyer observed that insurance
companies seem to rely on the preexisting condition rationalization to justify
denying coverage to domestic violence victims, because battered women denied
coverage on this basis are unlikely to challenge the insurers in court.
14 1
133. Abuse Not Pre-existing Condition, Bill Says the Legislation by Senator Paul Wellstone
Would Outlaw Refusal of Health Insurance Coverage for Battered Women, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Mar. 11, 1995, at 13A, available in 1995 WL 5628992 [hereinafter Abuse].
134. Scherzer, supra note 76, at 421; see also Papa, supra note 74, at 689.
135. Clifford & Iuculano, supra note 118, at 1819.
136. See Abuse, supra note 133; see also Shen, supra note 52.
137. See Stein, supra note 8, at 17; see also Shen, supra note 52.
138. Stein, supra note 8, at 17.
139. Diana G. Erwin, Some Insurance Policies Add to Abuse of Women, THE SACRAMENTO
BEE, Mar. 2, 1995, at A2, available in 1995 WL 4102359.
140. cherzer, supra note 76, at 421.
141. Erwin, supra note 139.
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III. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
In response to insurance discrimination against domestic violence victims, both
federal and state legislatures have made efforts to resolve the controversy. At the
federal level, several members of Congress have introduced bills that prohibit
insurance companies from utilizing a history of domestic violence when making
underwriting decisions. Similarly, a number of state legislatures have recognized
this type of discrimination by either enacting or considering proposals
prohibiting insurers from denying or limiting insurance coverage for injuries on
the basis of domestic violence. Finally, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners has proposed a model code that would forbid insurers from
engaging in certain types of insurance discrimination against abuse victims.
A. Federal Legislation
In 1994, Congress passed landmark legislation making domestic violence a
federal crime.' In the Violence Against Women Act of 1994,' Congress
created federal crimes of domestic violence, recognizing both the severity and
magnitude of the problem. Senator Joseph Biden, the author of the Act, stated
that the legislation's purpose is to classify domestic violence as a serious
criminal infraction. "The Violence Against Women Act is intended to respond
both to the underlying attitude that this violence is somehow less serious than
other crime and to the resulting failure of our criminal justice system to address
such violence."'
44
Building upon the impetus for treating domestic violence as a serious crime,
Congress has started to address the harms of domestic violence in other legal
contexts besides criminal justice. Within the past year, Congress has introduced
several bills relating to insurance coverage and domestic violence. Some bills
prohibit insurance discrimination against battered women exclusively in the
realm of health insurance; however, the most recent proposal would ban the
practice in all lines of insurance. A major point of contention between advocates
on behalf of domestic violence victims and the insurance companies turns upon
whether insurance companies will be able to examine an individual's medical
records for a history of domestic violence.
142. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, 108 Stat. 1902
(codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) (1994).
143. For a general discussion of proposed variations of the Violence Against Women Act
of 1994 leading to its enacted form, see Birgit Schmidt Am Busch, Domestic Violence and Title
III of the Violence Against Women Act of 1993: A Feminist Critique, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S
L.J. 1 (1995); see also Hallock, supra note 10.
144. S. REP.No. 138, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1993).
[Vol. 72:259
INSURANCE DISCRIMINATION
1. Description of House Bill 2654
On November 16, 1995, United States Representative Bernie Sanders of
Vermont introduced the latest bill which, if enacted, would prohibit insurance
discrimination against victims of domestic violence. The legislation, entitled the
Victims of Abuse Insurance Protection Act,141 would prohibit insurers from
denying abuse victims coverage in all forms of insurance. The proposed
legislation reads:
(a) No insurer or health carrier may, directly or indirectly, engage in any of
the following acts or practices on the basis that the applicant or insured, or
any person employed by the applicant or insured or with whom the applicant
or insured is known to have a relationship or association, is, has been, or may
be the subject of abuse:
(1) Denying, refusing to issue, renew or reissue, or canceling or otherwise
terminating an insurance policy or health benefit plan.
(2) Restricting, excluding, or limiting insurance or health benefit plan
coverage for losses as a result of abuse or denying a claim incurred by an
insured as a result of abuse, except as otherwise permitted or required by
State laws relating to life insurance beneficiaries.
(3) Adding a premium differential to any insurance policy or health benefit
plan.
(4) Terminating health coverage for a subject of abuse because coverage was
originally issued in the name of the abuser and the abuser has divorced,
separated from, or lost custody of the'subject of abuse or the abuser's
coverage has terminated voluntarily or involuntarily .... Nothing in this
paragraph prohibits the insurer from requiring the subject of abuse to pay full
premium for the subject's coverage under the health plan. 146
The language of this legislation constrains insurers from discriminating against
domestic violence victims in several ways. First, insurance companies cannot
refuse to issue or terminate an insurance policy on the basis of abuse. Second,
insurers cannot limit coverage or deny claims which arise from domestic violence
incidents. Third, the Bill prohibits companies from charging a higher premium
based on a prior history of abuse. Finally, insurers cannot terminate health
coverage for a domestic violence victim when the original coverage was issued
in the abuser's name and when the abuser's acts would otherwise cause the
victim to lose coverage.
145. H.R. 2654, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
146. Id.
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2. Privacy Protections
The legislation proposed by Representative Sanders also protects the privacy
of abuse-related information by including a confidentiality provision that protects
victims from having abuse-related information transferred among insurers and
through commercial databases. 4 7 The relevant section states:
No insurer may use, disclose, or transfer information relating to an
applicant's or insured's abuse status or abuse-related medical condition or the
applicant's or insured's status as a family member, employer or associate,
person in a relationship with a subject of abuse for any purpose unrelated to
the direct provision of health care services unless such use, disclosure, or
transfer is required by an order of an entity with authority to regulate
insurance or an order of a court of competent jurisdiction or by abuse
reporting laws. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as limiting or
precluding a subject of abuse from obtaining the subject's own medical
records from an insurer. 48
This provision limits the ability of insurers to utilize information regarding
abuse for any purpose except providing medical care. In addition, this part of the
Bill prohibits insurers from sharing confidential data about a victim's history of
abuse and her prior inability to obtain insurance coverage through commercial
databases.'49 Without this protection, an insurer learning through an information
pool that another company previously denied an applicant insurance would likely
assume that the victim is a bad risk and deny her coverage as well. 5 In addition,
both the victim and people in a relationship with the victim, such as family
members or employers, get protection from the confidentiality clause. Another
strength of this provision is that it explicitly allows abuse victims unlimited
access to their own medical records which might be in the hands of an insurer.
As a result, the victim is fully aware of exactly what information the insurance
company has available to it and on what basis it makes coverage decisions.
Finally, granting applicants the right to review their personal files also deters
improper underwriting decisions by the insurer.
Insurers generally are not required by state law to disclose the reasons they
reject insurance applicants.'' This Bill imposes a requirement that the insurer
give a mandatory written notice of, and state the reason for, any adverse action
relating to the insurance policy to the abuse victim. The language of the Bill
provides: "An insurer that takes any adverse action relating to any plan or policy
of a subject of abuse, shall advise the subject of abuse applicant or insured of the
specific reasons for the action in writing. Reference to general underwriting
practices or guidelines does not constitute a specific reason.' ' 52
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
150. See supra part II.B.
15 1. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
152. H.R. 2654, supra note 145.
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This provision is beneficial because it protects victims of abuse by requiring
insurers to adhere to a simple and straightforward procedure when rejecting an
applicant or refusing to cover an injury. This will deter insurers from obscuring
discriminatory actions in general rejection letters. In addition, the notice
requirement empowers abuse victims by informing them of the status of their
insurance and providing them with evidence of discriminatory underwriting for
enforcement purposes.
B. Enforcement Mechanisms
House Bill 2654 provides victims who experience insurance discrimination
with two avenues of redress.'53 First, the Act authorizes the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") to investigate and determine whether any insurer has
violated the terms of the statute. The operative language states:
The Federal Trade Commission shall have the power to examine and
investigate any insurer to determine whether such insurer has been or is
engaged in any act or practice prohibited by this Act. If the Federal Trade
Commission determines an insurer has been or is engaged in any act or
practice prohibited by'this Act, the Commission may take action against such
insurer by the issuance of a cease and desist order as if the insurer was in
violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Such cease and
desist order may include any individual relief warranted under the
circumstances, including temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive
and compensatory relief."5 4
If the FTC discovers a violation, it may issue cease and desist orders which
may include individual relief for the victim. Any violation of the FTC's order is
subject to civil penalties of up to $10,000 in fines for each infraction.
Second, the Act creates a private right of action for victims who experience
insurance discrimination: "An applicant or insured claiming to be adversely
affected by an act or practice of an insurer in violation of this Act may maintain
an action against the insurer.... Upon proof of such conduct by a preponderance
of the evidence, the court may award appropriate relief."'55 Thus, the Bill
authorizes battered women to file a private action against the insurance company
in federal court to secure injunctive relief, damages, and attorneys fees and costs.
The existence of a private right of action allows victims to sue insurance
companies who engage in unlawful discrimination directly, rather than waiting
for the overburdened FTC to pursue an administrative remedy. This section
empowers battered women by encouraging them to protect their own pecuniary
interests while also placing additional pressure on discriminatory insurers, who
would then be amenable to suit from two parties-the FTC and the wronged
applicant.
153. IM
154. Id.
155. Id.
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C. State Enactments
State legislatures have recently begun to consider adopting legislation which
would ban insurance discrimination against domestic violence victims. Since
1994, six states have enacted laws making such discrimination illegal: California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, and Massachusetts." 6 In addition, over
fourteen other states have proposed legislative or regulatory approaches to this
issue.5
7
On October 4, 1995, California enacted a statute which prohibits insurance
discrimination against domestic violence victims. The language of the statute
provides:
(a) No health care service plan shall deny, refuse to enroll, refuse to renew,
cancel, restrict, or otherwise terminate, exclude, or limit coverage, or charge
a different rate for the same coverage, on the basis that the applicant or
covered person is, has been, or may be a victim of domestic violence.
(b) Nothing... shall prevent a health care service plan from underwriting
coverage on the basis of the medical condition of an individual so long as the
consideration of the condition (1) does not take into account whether such an
individual's medical condition was caused by an act of domestic violence, (2)
is the same with respect to an applicant or enrollee who is not the subject of
domestic violence as with an applicant or enrollee who is the subject of
domestic violence, and (3) does not violate any other act, regulation, or rule
of law. The fact that an individual is, has been, or may be the subject of
domestic violence shall not be considered a medical condition.'
The California law is an example of just one state statute banning
discrimination against victims of domestic violence. Although the statutory
language varies, most state legislation contains loopholes potentially allowing
insurers to continue to discriminate against battered women. For instance, the
California statute only prohibits discrimination in health insurance; thus, the law
leaves insurers free to discriminate in other areas, such as life or property and
casualty insurance. On the other hand, one strong point of the California
provision relates to medical conditions. 9 Insurers are not allowed to deny
battered women coverage simply because they discovered a history of domestic
violence in the applicant's medical records.
Many of the state statutes or proposals have significant shortcomings. For
instance, some prohibit discrimination against domestic violence victims only in
the realm of health insurance, instead of in all lines of insurance.'° Further, some
156. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.75 (West Supp. 1996); Insurance
Discrimination, supra note 8.
157. NAIC Roundup, THE INS. REGULATOR, Dec. 11, 1995, available in 1995 WL 7146438;
see also Insurance Discrimination, supra note 8.
158. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.75 (West Supp. 1996).
159. For a discussion of medical histories, see infra part III.D.2.
160. The previously mentioned California statute is one piece of legislation covering only
health insurance. For an example of a more comprehensive proposal covering health, life, and
disability policies, see Alaska S.B. 197, 19th Leg., 2d Sess. (1996).
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state laws allow insurers to underwrite on the basis of preexisting medical
conditions, potentially allowing insurers to deny coverage to applicants who have
a history of domestic violence documented in medical records.' 6'
In addition, most of the proposed or enacted state statutes are not nearly as
comprehensive as the proposed federal legislation because they do not allow
individuals access to their own insurance records. 62 Moreover, the state laws do
not require insurers to provide the insured with a written explanation for adverse
actions taken which affect insurance coverage. 63 Finally, the state legislation
rarely provides the wronged individual with a private right of action.' 64 All of
these shortfalls lessen the protection afforded to domestic violence victims under
state antidiscrimination measures and reinforce the need for a comprehensive
federal remedy.
Making progress in state legislatures is also slow work-only a handful of
states have actually passed antidiscrimination statutes-for several reasons. First,
state reform measures are often frustrated by insurers' threats of withdrawal from
conducting business in the state. 65 In addition, insurance companies constitute
a powerful lobby and often apply political pressure that state regulators have
trouble resisting. 166 Finally, insurance companies are usually national or
international in nature and operate across state lines, making enforcement of
individual state laws difficult. 67 For these reasons, comprehensive federal
legislation appears to be the only uniform way to prohibit insurers from
discriminating against abuse victims.
D. NAIC State Model Legislation
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC") is an
association of all state insurance regulators 6 1 that coordinates state insurance
regulation. 69 One goal of the NAIC is to serve the public interest by helping state
insurance officials achieve laws which fairly and equitably treat insurance
consumers. 7 The NAIC began to study the effects of insurance discrimination
161. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2304(24) (West Supp. 1995) (allowing insurers to
underwrite based on the preexisting condition of abuse only if such conditions are routinely
underwritten in the same manner for applicants who are not abuse victims).
162. See Louisiana S.B. 1369, Reg. Sess. (1995).
163. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-816(18) (West Supp. 1996); Maryland H.B. 39, Reg.
Sess. (1996).
164. Compare Illinois H.B. 2502, 89th Gen. Ass. (1996) (allowing private right of action)
with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2159-B (West Supp. 1996) (disallowing victim to
directly sue discriminating insurance company).
165. Wortham, supra note 59, at 416.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Insurance Discrimination, supra note 8.
169. Fountain, supra note 9.
170. Memorandum from Nancy Durborow, Health Projects Coordinator, Pennsylvania
Coalition Against Domestic Violence, and Terry Fromson, Staff Attorney, Women's Law
Project, to Domestic Violence Advocates (June 30, 1995) (unpublished memorandum on file
with the Indiana Law Journal).
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against victims of domestic violence in 1995, as soon as it discovered the
presence of the practice. The association has stated publicly that it has a goal of
developing a model law which would prohibit such discrimination.''
1. Proposed Model Law
The NAIC's Discriminatory Practices Working Group recently completed
drafting model legislation which prohibits unfair discrimination against domestic
violence victims. 7 ' The draft language reads as follows: "No insurer or health
carrier may engage, directly or indirectly, in an unfairly discriminatory act or
practice against a subject of abuse .... [T]he discriminatory acts and practices
described and prohibited in this Act are egregious and are presumed to have been
committed in conscious disregard of this Act."'
7 3
In addition to prohibiting unfair discrimination against abuse victims, the
guidelines contained in the proposed model law define abuse and also furnish
the following examples of discriminatory practices:
A. Denying; refusing to issue, renew or reissue; canceling or otherwise
terminating a health benefit plan; or restricting or excluding health benefit
plan coverage; or adding a premium differential to any health benefit plan on
the basis of the applicant's or insured's abuse status;
B. Excluding or limiting coverage for losses or denying a claim incurred by
an insured as a result of abuse on the basis of the insured's abuse status;
C. Terminating group coverage for a subject of abuse because coverage was
originally issued in the name of the abuser and the abuser has divorced,
sepdrated fiom, or lost custody of the subject of abuse, or the abuser's
coverage has terminated voluntarily or involuntarily.... ; or
D. Disclosure or transfer of any information by person employed by or
contracting with a health carrier relating to an applicant's or insured's abuse
status ... for any purpose unrelated to the direct provision of health care
171. Id.
172. Shelton, supra note 52, at 12.
173. UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SUBJECTS OF ABUSE IN HEALTH BENEFIT PLANS
MODEL ACT § 2 (Proposed Official Draft, Dec. 4, 1995).
174. The NAIC model law defines abuse as the occurrence of one or more of the following
acts:
(1) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing another
person, including a minor child, bodily injury, physical harm, severe emotional
distress, psychological trauma, rape, sexual assault or involuntary sexual
intercourse;
(2) Knowingly engaging in a course of conduct... under circumstances that place
the person or minor child in reasonable fear of bodily injury or physical harm;
(3) Subjecting another person.., to false imprisonment; or
(4) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing damage
to property so as to intimidate or attempt to control the behavior of another person
Id. § IA.
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services, except where required by the commissioner, a court of competent
jurisdiction, or abuse reporting laws.17
The model law establishes guidelines for insurers to follow when advising
abuse victims of adverse insurance decisions. An insurer must provide the
victims with a written explanation for the adverse action and must be able to
demonstrate that the action was not discriminatory.'76 Perhaps the strongest facet
of the NAIC proposal is that it establishes protocols to which insurers must
adhere when working with abuse victims whose safety is at stake. The proposal
mandates that "[h]ealth carriers and insurers shall develop, file with the
insurance commissioner, and adhere to protocols specifying how company
employees, contractors, agents and brokers will pursue an insurance action,
including claims investigation and subrogation, that may impact the safety of a
subject of abuse involved with that action."' 77
Once the model law has been approved by the entire NAIC, it will be ready for
implementation by the states.'78 However, even if the NAIC endorses a draft
which prohibits discrimination against battered women, the NAIC cannot compel
insurance regulators to adopt and implement the regulation in their home
states. 79 Fortunately, insurers are likely to consider themselves bound by the
regulation even if a particular state insurance commissioner fails to adopt it, as
history shows that once a few states endorse a model law of the NAIC, most
insurance companies comply."' As a consequence, the NAIC model legislation
will likely have a significant impact on changing the discriminatory practices of
insurers.
2. Potential Pitfalls
Controversy over the place of medical histories looms large between advocates
for abuse victims and insurance lobbyists in debates surrounding any legislation.
Insurers underwrite on the basis of preexisting medical conditions when they
examine medical records."' Some insurers support model legislation as long as
it preserves their right to gain access to the medical records of applicants and
underwrite on the basis of information contained in the records." 2 Insurance
companies insist that they cannot effectively assess the risk of certain applicants
unless they can examine the applicant's past medical history.
However, allowing unfettered underwriting on the basis of medical histories
is no longer appropriate because it undermines the purpose of protecting abuse
175. Id. §3.
176. Id. §4.
177. Id. § 5.
178. Memorandum from Terry Fromson, Staff Attorney, Women's Law Project, to the
National Organization of Women Legal Defense and Education Fund Committee on Insurance
Coverage and Domestic Violence (Nov. 21, 1995) (unpublished memorandum on file with the
Indiana Law Journal).
179. Schatz, supra note 66, at 1789.
180. Id.
181. Light, supra note 59, at 2503-04.
182. Fountain, supra note 9.
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victims from discrimination. This practice would allow insurers to discover
which applicants are likely victims of abuse and indirectly discriminate against
them. Health care providers may have documented in a chart an injury stemming
from abuse, which will then become part of the medical record available to the
insurer. Additionally, the insurer will be able to examine the records for injuries
commonly associated with domestic violence-such as black eyes or
bruises-and use this as a basis for rendering an applicant ineligible for
insurance coverage."' Because there is little regulation of underwriting
practices,' insurers may use these techniques to weed out domestic violence
victims during the application process, allowing the discrimination to remain
undetected.
Insurers will continue to have access to medical records for general
underwriting purposes. As a result, it must be assumed that they will discover or
discern which applicants are victims of domestic violence. Consequently, any
legislation must clearly forbid insurers from denying insurance coverage to abuse
victims, in all instances, to effectively end discriminatory practices.
E. Endorsement of House Bill 2654
Ultimately, Congress must adopt a uniform federal remedy to proscribe all
insurance companies from discriminating against battered women. Passage of
federal House Bill 265485 would provide uniform protection from insurance
discrimination to abuse victims in all states, regardless of whether individual
state legislatures have implemented this type of legislation. 8 6 A comprehensive
federal remedy would ensure that fleeing domestic violence victims still have
effective insurance coverage even if they go to other states.
House Bill 2654 presents a strong statutory response to discriminatory
practices. First, it includes an extensive explanation of exactly which insurance
practices constitute unlawful discrimination. This complete description serves a
dual purpose: it puts insurers on notice of prohibited practices and also aids in
prosecution by providing victims with a clear definition of wrongful acts.
Second, the Bill protects the privacy of battered women by preventing insurers
from sharing abuse-related medical information through commercial databases.
The legislation also retains the insured's right to access of her own records which
are in the insurer's hands. Third, House Bill 2654 requires insurance companies
to provide applicants or insureds with written notice and an explanation of any
adverse action they take relating to insurance coverage. Finally, the proposal
authorizes two methods of enforcement, through a private right of action and an
administrative remedy.1
87
House Bill 2654 empowers abuse victims by granting them a private right of
action, while also providing victims with the tools necessary to take on insurers
183. Insurance Discrimination, supra note 8.
184. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
185. H.R. 2654, supra note 145.
186. Although several states are considering similar legislation, only six had enacted
legislation as of the writing of this Note. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
187. See generally discussion supra part III.A-B.
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in judicial proceedings. These tools include a comprehensive definition of
discriminatory practices, written notice for any adverse actions taken by the
insurer, and protections against privacy invasion through the compilation of
sensitive abuse-related medical information in commercial data banks. These
provisions aid individual abuse victims by making court challenges against
insurance companies feasible.'8 8
IV. ENDING DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES
The insurance industry performs an essential function in American society by
providing financial security for individual policyholders who are faced with
catastrophes. Due to the special nature of insurance, regulating insurers'
underwriting practices which harm battered women is both a necessary and
appropriate measure. Discrimination against battered women, who are crime
victims, is just as unacceptable as other types of discrimination which our society
condemns. Federal legislation prohibiting insurance companies from refusing to
cover victims of domestic violence must be adopted to end discrimination against
these victims of crime. This type of comprehensive legislation will encourage the
insurance industry to take steps to prevent spousal abuse and to lobby for
increased prosecution and tougher penalties for those who violate criminal law
by engaging in spousal abuse. Further, insurers are in the best position to spread
domestic violence costs due to the loss distribution function of insurance.
A. Eliminating Discrimination Against Battered Women
Society as a whole, through legislative enactments and court mandates, has
determined that discrimination based on race, gender, national origin, and
religion may not be used as a basis for denying individuals access to basic needs
such as employment, shelter, and insurance.' 9 Discrimination is impermissible
even when nondiscriminatory behavior is more expensive for the private
sector.' 9' Battered women are often both crime victims and victims of insurance
discrimination. The pending federal legislation, which classifies battered women
as a protected group, ensures that these women will no longer be victimized the
second time by discriminatory insurance practices. Although insurers may be
required to absorb abuse-related claims, they already do this for other protected
classes; this is no excuse for engaging in this type of discrimination.
Domestic violence permeates all boundaries of society, affecting men and
women of every race and every socioeconomic level. 9 Because the practice is
uniform across society and analogous to other types of unacceptable
discrimination, Congress enacted the landmark Violence Against Women Act of
1994, which categorizes domestic violence as a federal crime.' 92 In the past,
188. See discussion supra part III.A-B.
189. Lowe, supra note 81, at 528-30; Schatz, supra note 66, at 1792.
190. Schatz, supra note 66, at 1791-92.
191. Hyman, supra note 7, at 1781.
192. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
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Congress banned discrimination on the basis of race, religion, gender, ethnicity,
and national origin through a number of legislative mandates. 93 The Violence
Against Women Act treats crimes of domestic violence in the same manner as
those motivated by religious, racial, or ethnic bias.'94 The Violence Against
Women Act recognizes that violent crimes committed because of a person's
gender similarly raise issues of equality as well as safety and accountability.
Long ago, Congress recognized that an individual who is attacked because of
race is deprived of rights to be free and equal; we should guarantee the same
protection for victims who are attacked because of their gender.
Whether the violence is motivated by racial bias, ethnic bias, or gender bias,
the protection of the law should be the same.' 95 Since Congress has already
regulated society from engaging in pervasive discrimination against victims of
gender-based crimes, it should prohibit discriminatory insurance practices
against victims of the crime of domestic violence.
Ending domestic violence, by virtue of public and private initiatives, has
become a matter of public interest.'96 Through both legislative reform and private
outcry, society has condemned the practice of domestic violence and has shown
a commitment to helping victims survive and reach safety. Insurance practices
that discriminate against domestic violence victims contradict public health and
welfare goals aimed at eliminating domestic violence and threaten to unravel
over twenty years of work to protect abuse victims. Insurance discrimination
discourages battered women from seeking necessary medical treatment and legal
intervention, deters them from filing insurance claims, and constructs one more
economic barrier that prevents victims from leaving abusive environments. For
these reasons, Congress should adopt comprehensive legislation prohibiting
insurance discrimination.
Insurance companies are private businesses dealing in a particularly crucial
commodity for society as a whole. Insurance has become a necessity in providing
financial security for individuals, 97 and the personal lines of insurance' 98 play
a critical role in guarding against potential disaster. Public policy decisions by
lawmakers leave private insurance as the primary safety net for individuals, with
the exception of reliance on government-funded programs. 99 As a result, the
government should be responsible for ensuring widespread insurance
availability,0 0 particularly for victims of abuse, because "such an important
193. See generally U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
352, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (current version at Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994)).
194. Catherine F. Klein, Full Faith & Credit: Interstate Enforcement of Protection Orders
Under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 29 FAM. L.Q. 253, 253 (1995).
195. MAJORITY STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 103D CONG., 1 ST SESS., THE
RESPONSES TO RAPE: DETOURS ON THE ROAD TO EQUAL JUSTICE 14 (Comm. Print 1993).
196. See supra part I.B.
197. Schatz, supra note 66, at 1792; Wortham, supra note 59, at 350-51.
198. The personal lines of insurance traditionally include automobile, homeowners' or
renters', health, life, and disability insurance. Wortham, supra note 59, at 351.
199. Scherzer, supra note 76, at 412; Wortham, supra note 59, at 350-51.
200. Wortham, supra note 59, at 350. See generally Schatz, supra note 66, at 1792.
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component of the personal financial infrastructure should not be left to the
vagaries of the free market.
2 0
'
The objective of insurance companies in maximizing profits often conflicts
with the public goal of supplying expansive insurance coverage."2 Insurance
companies resist regulation by asserting that they are private businesses who are
responsible for conducting business with an eye towards profitability, not the
public interest." 3 Yet because insurers undisputedly control public access to an
essential commodity in society, they experience broad governmental
intervention2° to ensure that they exercise financial and ethical responsibility.0 5
Additionally, courts have generally rejected insurers' assertions that economic
considerations justify discriminatory behavior. 6 The goal of insurance
regulation is to allow insurance companies to operate profitably while curbing
those practices which, due to the profit motive, threaten important public
values.20 7 This regulation should be expanded to forbid insurers from unfairly
discriminating against victims of domestic violence because the insurance
industry continues to be profitable for insurers.2 8
The United States Supreme Court endorsed regulation of the insurance
industry, an industry "affected with a public interest," over seventy-five years
ago.2" The Court justified regulation of the private insurance industry by noting
insurance's critical function in spreading loss throughout society, thereby
reducing the burden of unexpected misfortune on individuals."' The risk-
spreading function of insurance prevents individuals from bearing the enormous
cost of a catastrophe alone, 2" and this should include the abuse-related costs
accrued by battered women. For this reason, legislation prohibiting insurers from
discriminating against domestic violence victims must be implemented. This
legislation helps to eliminate the social inequality created by discrimination
against abuse victims and also protects the public interest by ensuring that
battered women and children who leave abusive situations have access to
adequate health care.
201. Lowe, supra note 81, at 531.
202. Scherzer, supra note 76, at 412.
203. Id See generally Schatz, supra note 66, at 1791.
204. Clifford & luculano, supra note 118, at 1809-11; see also supra part II.
205. Scherzer, supra note 76, at 413.
206. Schatz, supra note 66, at 1791 (citing cases in which courts prohibited landlords and
employers from discriminating against African-Americans, Jews, and women even though the
non-discriminatory policies were more costly due to the prejudice of neighbors, customers, or
co-workers).
207. Scherzer, supra note 76, at 413.
208. The premiums insurers charge to policyholders include a specific portion of profit. Ideal
premiums match the insurance loss and expenses attributable to the individual or group
member, as well as a "reasonable" amount of profit for the insurer. Lowe, supra note 81, at
524.
209. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389, 406-08 (1914) (upholding a state's
right to regulate fire insurance rates).
210. Id. at 412-13.
211. Lowe, supra note 81, at 531.
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Society should not tolerate discrimination against people solely because they
have been victims of crime. Allowing insurers to deny abuse victims insurance
coverage is discrimination at its worst-denying a battered woman access to a
basic necessity simply because an abuser has victimized her in the past. Since we
as a society have made a commitment to eradicate domestic violence, victims of
abuse must be included in a protected category because discrimination against
them represents yet another invidious form of prejudice.
B. Requiring Insurers to Manage Abuse-Related Costs
There are a variety of reasons why insurance companies, rather than the
government, are in the best position to shoulder the costs of domestic violence.
First, insurers have the capacity to distribute more evenly the expenses generated
by domestic violence over a wide base of policyholders due to the loss spreading
functions of insurance. Second, it is important to remember that insurers, unlike
the government, are in the business because they reap significant profits.212
Third, managing health costs is the insurance industry's self-proclaimed
specialty;2 13 thus, insurers are much better equipped than government for
calculating and preventing the costs associated with battering. Fourth, insurers,
as institutions, are capable of devising schemes of shifting the costs of domestic
violence to abusers, while providing victims with the coverage they desperately
need.214
Finally, insurers will dramatically increase efforts directed at fighting domestic
violence when it is in the industry's economic self-interest to do so. Industry
commentators have noted that the insurance industry is "sorely in need of
corporate role models."2 5 In the past, insurers have taken steps to protect public
safety by educating consumers and lobbying legislatures for tougher seat belt
laws,216 drunk driving penalties, 217 and highway safety measures.2"8 These types
of lobbying efforts are in the insurance industry's economic interest-as public
212. See supra note 208.
213. Schatz, supra note 66, at 1804.
214. At first glance, shifting domestic violence-related expenses to abusers by allowing
insurers to sue them appears equitable. Forcing batterers to bear the expense of their activity
hypothetically serves the twin purposes of punishing the wrongdoer and deterring future abuse.
However, this solution is problematic: advocates who work with abuse victims report that
enraged abusers more typically retaliate against victims. As a result, subrogation is not an
effective deterrent against future episodes of battering and often places victims in imminent
danger. See Memorandum from Terry Fromson, Staff Attorney, Women's Law Project, to the
National Organization for Women Legal Defense and Education Fund Committee on Insurance
Coverage and Domestic Violence (Dec. 12, 1995) (unpublished memorandum on file with the
Indiana Law Journal).
215. A Heartening Initiative, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, May 29, 1995, at 16.
216. Warren Brown, Crash Course: Insurance Industry Opens Own Research Center To Test
Car Safety Claims, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1993, at Fl.
217. Warren Brown, Consumer Activists Joining With the Insurance Industry: Group Is To
Lobby for Highway Safety, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1989, at El.
218. Insurers & Other Safety Advocates Defend Helmet Laws, FED. & ST. INS. WK., Mar. 6,
1995, available in 1995 WL 8595975.
(Vol. 72:259
INSURANCE DISCRIMINATION
safety increases, insurance claims decrease, thus allowing insurers to operate
more profitably. The insurance industry can easily take similar steps in defraying
the claims attributable to abuse. When insurers must bear some of the costs of
domestic violence, they will become more socially responsible by funding
educational programs with the purpose of ending domestic violence,2 9 lobbying
elected officials to enact measures to reduce spousal abuse,' 0 and pressuring law
enforcement personnel to enforce existing laws against domestic violence.
Battered women who are subject to insurance discrimination currently must
shoulder abuse-related costs alone, a predictably impossible burden. Uninsured
victims who are in dire need of assistance often rely upon government programs
such as Medicare, Medicaid, and public hospitals for relief.22" ' As insurance
companies evade responsibility for insuring domestic violence victims, the
financial burden shifts to the government. The final outcome: society as a whole
picks up the tab of domestic violence through taxes, which results in the specific
social costs remaining both unidentified and unprevented.222
Although insurance companies are private businesses with a pecuniary mission,
they are the best entities to bear the social cost of domestic violence. The
insurance industry is prominent in American society: it has the power and the
resources to begin the formidable task of reducing, preventing, and finally
eliminating the shared public burden of domestic violence. Legislation banning
insurance discrimination against victims of domestic violence forces insurance
companies to stoli discriminating against the unfortunate victims of the crime of
domestic violence.
CONCIAJSION
The nation's largest insurance companies routinely engage in discriminatory
practices directed at battered women. A recent Congressional survey discovered
that some insurers refuse to cover applicants who have a history of domestic
abuse. In response, several members of Congress have proposed legislation that
prohibits insurers from using domestic violence as a rationale for denying
battered women insurance coverage.
Insurance discrimination against abuse victims is dangerous. The exclusion of
a battered woman from the insurance pool often leaves her with few choices but
to stay in the abusive situation to ensure appropriate access to medical care for
herself and her children. Discrimination also contributes to the social stigma
associated with abuse victims. This stigma silences battered women and prevents
them from seeking necessary medical treatment and reporting abuse to
219. One insurance company, State Farm Life, reversed its policy of discriminating against
battered women after it received a barrage of negative publicity. Subsequently, State Farm
initiated the Corporate Alliance To End Partner Violence, a coalition with the purpose of
forming an alliance of Fortune 500 companies dedicated to preventing and educating about
domestic violence. A Heartening Initiative, supra note 215, at 16.
220. See Schatz, supra note 66, at 1797.
221. Id. at 1804; Wortham, supra note 59, at 352; Zorza, supra note 14, at 383-85.
222. For a similar argument regarding the social costs of AIDS, see Schatz, supra note 66,
at 1804.
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authorities, allowing the abusers to remain unaccountable for the crimes they
perpetrate. Such silence ultimately leads to higher costs associated with
battering; when the crime is not reported, it is more difficult to effectively direct
education and prevention measures.
Society should not tolerate discrimination against victims of domestic violence.
When insurers refuse to cover battered women, they hold victims responsible for
the criminal activity of abusers. Federal legislation prohibiting insurance
discrimination supports the efforts of victims who leave abusive partners by
ensuring adequate insurance coverage, which in turn alleviates some of the
economic barriers to leaving. In addition, enacting the proposed legislation will
encourage the insurance industry to develop strategies directed at the prevention
of domestic violence.
Society has condemned domestic violence through both public and private
initiatives. Congress has already passed the landmark Violence Against Women
Act of 1994, making domestic violence a federally prosecutable crime. Passage
of legislation prohibiting insurance discrimination represents one more step in
the fight to extinguish the tragedy of domestic violence from the daily lives of
over four million women.
